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Caroline Edwards 
 
From Eros to Eschaton: Herbert Marcuse’s Liberation of Time 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
This article explores what Gershom Scholem has called Herbert Marcuse’s 
“unacknowledged ties to [his] Jewish heritage.” At the core of Marcuse’s vision 
of transformed, non-repressive social relations is a struggle over time, which 
rests upon a distinctly Jewish approach to the twin questions of remembrance 
and redemption. One example of this approach is the temporal dialectic 
between alienated labor time and the timelessness of pleasure’s desire for 
eternity which underpins Marcuse’s analysis in Eros and Civilisation (1956). 
This dialectic rests upon Marcuse’s reading of the Freudian opposition 
between life-affirming Eros and the death drive; which he traces through a 
phylogenetic reading of primal society’s recurring crime of patricide that 
continues to haunt advanced industrial capitalism.  
I argue that we should read Marcuse’s privileging of the Freudian Eros-
Thanatos dualism as tacitly redefining political struggle through the 
affirmation of a redemptive model of cyclical time, which responds to a Jewish 
apocalyptic-utopian tradition. I consider the ways in which Marcuse’s later 
writings in such texts as “Liberation from the Affluent Society” (1968) An 
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Essay on Liberation (1969), Five Lectures (1970) and Counter-Revolution 
and Revolt (1972) reveal the liberation of time to be grounded in the 
uncovering of nature’s “erotic cathexis.” Cyclical time thus offers Marcuse an 
Orphic recourse with which to confront the linear time of advanced industrial 
capitalism. In reading Marcuse’s delinearization of time through a 
reformulated understanding of Judeo-Christian eschatology, I conclude, we 
are afforded a fuller account of the way in which time underpins Marcuse’s 
appeals to utopia. 
 
 
 
 
Article: 
 
The German rediscovery of messianism in the first decade of the twentieth 
century gave voice to a new way of thinking about the utopian future that 
privileged redemption in its denunciation of progressivist notions of 
Enlightenment rationality. Profoundly uneasy with the growing anti-liberal 
and anti-Semitic upper classes of the Weimar Republic, the German-Jewish 
“generation of 1914” drew inspiration from the figure of the Messiah in 
answer to the nineteenth-century utopian-socialist dream of scientific 
rationality. “Messianism of our era,” as Gershom Scholem wrote, “proves its 
immense force precisely in this form of the revolutionary apocalypse, and no 
longer in the form of a rational utopia (if one may call it that) of eternal 
progress as the Enlightenment’s surrogate for Redemption.”1 With the 
collapse of the philosophical, political, cultural and aesthetic frames of 
reference that had bolstered European bourgeois culture – which reached its 
nadir with the onset of the First World War – there emerged a renewal of 
interest in eschatology.  
 
 
Secularizing eschatological time  
 
Derived from the Greek ἔσχατος (eschatos, meaning “last”), eschatology 
loosely refers to the theological study of last or final things. Israelite 
eschatology refers more particularly to the “expectation of a future eon 
radically discontinuous with the present,” whilst Christian eschatology has 
predominantly been identified as “presuppos[ing] a linear view of time.”2 
Broadly speaking, Judeo-Christian eschatological frameworks have had a 																																																								
1 Gershom Scholem qtd in Michael Löwy, Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian 
Thought in Central Europe: A Study in Elective Affinity, trans. Hope Heaney (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 18. 
2 Bill T. Arnold, “Old Testament Eschatology and the Rise of Apocalypticism” in Jerry L. Walls 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 23-
39 (p. 24); Stephen T. Davis, “Eschatology and Resurrection” in Jerry L. Walls (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Eschatology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 384-398 (p. 
384). We should note, however, that feminist biblical scholars in particular critique the “linear 
understanding of time that is unjustly applied to the interpretation of early Christianity.”  See 
Luise Schottroff, Silvia Schroer and Marie Theres Wacker, Feminist Interpretation: The Bible 
in Women’s Perspective, trans. Martin and Barbara Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Augsberg 
Fortress, 1988), p. 216. 
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fundamental impact upon the way in which the Western world conceives of 
time: both in the sense, as phenomenologists describe, of universal time 
(referred to as clock-time, historical time or objective time) and in the sense of 
a subjective experience of time (lived time or human temporality). Both 
universal and subjective temporal economies encountered a radical shift with 
the emergence of the modern in Western philosophy, as older cyclical 
temporalities were replaced by a linear model of historical time predicated 
upon Christian eschatology.3 Enlightenment hopes for the construction of a 
better world were thus shaped in axiomatic ways by Judeo-Christian 
narratives of hope and transcendence, and the teleologies of science, 
rationality and progress secularized particular eschatological themes. As Max 
L. Stackhouse writes, thinkers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx can be described 
as offering “heretical legacies of the biblical traditions translated into utopian 
teleologies.”4  
This revival of eschatological ideas became secularized in the early 
twentieth century through the (unorthodox) Marxist projects of such thinkers 
as Theodor Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Erich Fromm, Georg Lukács, Martin Buber 
and Walter Benjamin. What had, during the nineteenth century, been 
overshadowed by a focus on a Christian kerygma – that pronounced that the 
Jesus of the Gospels was “the moral paragon of modern, liberal man” – now 
came to the fore: the rediscovery of St. Paul and the promise of salvation.5 
This renewed interest was, as Anson Rabinbach notes, at once secular and 
theological: grounded in an “[a]pocalyptic, catastrophic, utopian and 
pessimistic” reading of messianism.6 The cataclysmic destruction and human 
sacrifice exacted in the trenches profoundly affected the German-Jewish 
theologian and philosopher Franz Rosenzweig, whose monumental study The 
Star of Redemption (1921) was actually written on the Macedonian battlefield. 
For Rosenzweig, the nineteenth-century liberal model of social and historical 
progress had irreversibly disintegrated, leading him to reject the metaphysical 
Hegelian marriage of historical totality with truth, and to assert that 
redemption would come through scaled-down instances of religious 
affirmation, not through historical progress: “We see God in every ethical 
event, but not in one complete Whole, not in history.”7 The relationship 
between a detotalized understanding of historical time and redemption thus 
reached its apogee in those Marxist and utopian traditions of thought that 
produced the German-Jewish “generation of 1914.”8 As Michael Löwy and 																																																								
3 Peter Osborne, “Modernism and Philosophy” in The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms, ed. 
Peter Brooker, Andrzej Gasiorek, Deborah Longworth and Andrew Thacker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 388-409 (p. 392). 
4 Max L. Stackhouse, “Ethics and Eschatology” in The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, ed. 
Jerry L. Walls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 548-562 (p. 552). 
5 This point is made by Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, “‘To Brush History Against the Grain’: The 
Eschatology of the Frankfurt School and Ernst Bloch,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 51 (4) (1983): 631-650 (pp. 631-2). 6	Anson Rabinbach, “Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, Bloch and Modern 
German Jewish Messianism,” New German Critique 34 (1985): 78-124 (p. 81). Martin Buber 
also discusses the “socialist secularization of eschatology” through the Talmudic, Messianic 
overtones of what he calls a “dispossessed Marxism.” Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia (New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1996), pp. 8-10. 7	Rosenzweig qtd Mendes-Flohr, “To Brush History Against the Grain,” p. 632	
8 For a useful discussion of the “generation of 1914” see Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1978). 
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Renee B. Larrier note, various intellectual strands converge in modern Jewish 
messianism between 1900 and 1933 around the central problematic of 
European crisis. Such intellectual groups as “anarchistic religious Jews” 
(including Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem), “religious 
Jewish anarchists” (Gustav Landauer, Franz Kafka, Walter Benjamin) and 
“assimilated, atheist-religious, anarcho-Bolshevik Jews” (Georg Lukács, Ernst 
Toller, Ernst Bloch) thus crystallize around what Lukács described in 1910 as 
“anti-capitalist romanticism.”9  
The revival of Marxism in the Weimar period thus imbued from Jewish 
messianism what Anson Rabinbach has signified as four chief elements: its 
retrospective analytical perspective; its apocalyptic tone; its ethical 
ambivalence concerning the liberatory or eschatological possibilities of 
salvation in “this world”; and its redemptive utopian preoccupation.10 “The 
only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in the face of despair,” 
writes Adorno, is thus: 
 
the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present 
themselves from the standpoint of redemption. […] Perspectives 
must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it 
to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it 
will appear one day in the messianic light.11  
 
Adorno’s utopian-redemptive mode of contemplation – with its focus trained 
on the estranging possibilities of “the messianic light” – corresponds to the 
more secular development of utopian temporality in Frankfurt School critical 
theory, in which the role that memory can play in collective dreams of 
revolutionary futural emancipation becomes cardinal. However, even in this 
secular treatment of utopian interventions into what Walter Benjamin 
famously termed “homogeneous, empty time,” the Jewish tradition of 
historical redemption can still be identified as offering crucial intellectual 
sustenance to Marxist-utopian theories of social transformation.12 As Ehud 
Luz argues, the commandment to remember is “associated with the idea of the 
covenant between the people of Israel and God, their commitment to each 
other.”13 Under the influence of Lurianic mysticism in the late sixteenth 
century this remembrance had assumed a less politically quietist cast, 
reclaiming redemption from the realm of divine mysticism through the 
gradual, agglutinated work of rectification by individuals (tikkun). “[M]emory 
of the past and hope for the future come together in the present,” writes Luz, 
“to create a totality that transforms the meaning of objective time.” Teshuvah 
ruptures causality and delinearizes time, reconfiguring time-consciousness 																																																								
9 Michael Löwy and Renee B. Larrier, “Jewish Messianism and Libertarian Utopia in Central 
Europe (1900-1933),” New German Critique 20 (2) (1980): 105-115 (pp. 112-113); Georg 
Lukács qtd Ibid, p. 110. 
10 Rabinbach, p. 84-7. 
11 Theodor W.  Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. 
Jephcott (London: NLB, 1974), p. 247. 
12 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), pp. 
253-64 (p. 261). 
13 Ehud Luz, “Utopia and Return: One the Structure of Utopian Thinking and Its Relation to 
Jewish-Christian Tradition,” The Journal of Religion 73 (3) (1993): 357-377 (p. 361). 
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until man’s misdeeds become cast “in a new light so that they are perceived as 
having some redeeming feature.”14 Although still notionally theurgic, Lurianic 
mysticism opened up utopian possibilities for collective human endeavour 
through the process of man’s return towards God and his authentic self 
undertaken in teshuvah.15 
 According to this reading, the struggle of collective memory in Judaism 
reveals its status as a utopian religion. Gershom Scholem has similarly 
commented on the congruence of ideas between the messianic regulative ideal 
of Jewish messianism and the secularized apocalyptic theory of revolution. He 
argues that any qualitative difference between these two traditions involves a 
“transposal of terminology,” in which the “Utopia of the world-transforming 
revolution” is shifted onto the register of eschatology:16 
 
That is the attitude behind the writings of the most important 
ideologists of revolutionary messianism, such as Ernst Bloch, 
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, whose 
acknowledged or unacknowledged ties to their Jewish heritage 
are evident.17  
 
Of course, much ink has been spilled on delineating the messianic-Judaic 
overtones of Bloch, Benjamin and Adorno;18 but Herbert Marcuse’s 
“unacknowledged ties to [his] Jewish heritage” (unacknowledged both in the 
sense of unattributed in his own writings, as well as unexamined by critical 
scholarship) remain curiously underexplored. Like his contemporaries 
Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith and Hans Jonas – all of whom also studied 
under Heidegger – Marcuse, as Richard Wolin observes, can be described as 
one of several intellectual “non-Jewish Jews who thought of themselves as 
proverbial ‘Germans of Jewish origin’.”19 Although Marcuse himself rarely 																																																								
14 Ibid., p. 367. 
15 Ibid., pp. 366-9. 
16 Gershom Scholem, “Reflections on Jewish Theology” in On Jews and Judaism in Crisis: 
Selected Essays, ed. Werner J. Dunnhauser (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), pp. 261-297 
(p. 287). 
17 Ibid. 
18 See, for instance, Anson Rabinbach, “Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, 
Bloch and Modern German Jewish Messianism,” New German Critique 34 (1985): 78-124 (p. 
81) and In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals Between Apocalypse and 
Enlightenment (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997) (p. 28); Michael 
Löwy and Renee B. Larrier, “Jewish Messianism and Libertarian Utopia in Central Europe 
(1900-1933),” New German Critique 20 (2) (1980): 105-115; Warren S. Goldstein, 
“Messianism and Marxism: Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch’s Dialectical Theories of 
Secularization,” Critical Sociology 27 (2) (2001): 246-281 (p. 246); Richard Wolin, “From 
Messianism to Materialism: The Later Aesthetics of Walter Benjamin,” New German Critique 
22 (1981): 81-108 (p. 93); Frances Daly, “The Fate of Hope in Hollow Spaces: Ernst Bloch’s 
Messianism” in Wayne Cristaudo and Wendy Baker (eds) Messianism, Apocalypse and 
Redemption in Twentieth Century German Thought (Adelaide: ATF Press, 2006), pp. 79-94; 
Wayne Whitson Floyd Jr., “Transcendence in the Light of Redemption: Adorno and the 
Legacy of Rosenzweig and Benjamin,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 61 
(3) (1993): 539-551; Bram Mertens, “‘Hope, Yes, But Not For Us’: Messianism and 
Redemption in the Work of Walter Benjamin,” Messianism, Apocalypse and Redemption in 
20th Century German Thought, ed. Wayne Cristaudo and Wendy Baker (Adelaide: ATF Press, 
2006), pp. 63-77. 
19 Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and 
Herbert Marcuse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 5. 
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talked about his own Jewish background, Peter Marcuse has said of the family 
that: “We were certainly Jewish; we would never have been in the US 
otherwise. My father was bar mitzvah’d, and to my knowledge his parents 
were relatively observant. But he himself was strictly secular.”20  
It will be my argument in this article that at the core of Marcuse’s 
vision of transformed, non-repressive social relations is a struggle over time. 
Although it is infrequently mentioned in his writings, time is fundamental to 
interrogating a number of Marcuse’s central ideas, including: his theorization 
of repressive society under advanced industrial capitalism; his championing of 
a more concrete understanding of utopia as both necessary and achievable; his 
distinction between “real” and “false” needs; his Fourierist recalibration of the 
relationship between work and libidinal pleasure; his reworking of Freud’s 
primal horde with its historically recurring crime of patricide and filial 
rebellion; and his invocation of a Schillerian “aesthetic ethos” and 
development of a “radical sensibility.” Marcuse’s framing of this temporal 
struggle rests upon a distinctly Jewish approach to the twin questions of 
remembrance and redemption. I will consider the ways in which we might 
read Marcuse’s privileging of cyclical time over the linear time of capitalist 
teleology through the prism of a reformulated Judeo-Christian eschatology, 
understood outside of its relationship with the so-called “secularized 
eschatologies” of shining modernity or hyper-technologized capitalist 
progress. It becomes possible through a reconsideration of pre-Hellenized 
Hebrew Scripture and early Christian thought to uncover eschatology’s 
earthliness; and it is my argument that Marcuse’s recourse to cyclical time 
would be productively read as encompassing the radical political overtones of 
utopian Jewish messianism. As Richard Wolin writes: 
 
if one digs beneath the surface, one detects in Marcuse’s political 
thought a palpable indebtedness to the tradition of Jewish 
Messianism that became a rite of passage for Central European 
Jewish intellectuals who came of age circa World War I.21  
 
In reading Marcuse’s appeals to non-repressive society via a consideration of 
the messianic connotations “beneath the surface,” we are afforded a fuller 
account of the way in which time underpins Marcuse’s appeals to utopia in a 
concrete, rather than speculative, framework – as the futural not yet 
germinates within the present time through its encounter with the redeemed 
memories of the past. This temporal redemption can be read as indebted to 
the secularized tradition of Jewish messianism evident also in the utopian 
philosophy of Ernst Bloch. Meanwhile, Marcuse’s later writings in such texts 
as “Liberation from the Affluent Society” (1968) An Essay on Liberation 
(1969), Five Lectures (1970) and Counter-Revolution and Revolt (1972) reveal 
the liberation of time to be grounded in the uncovering of nature’s “erotic 
cathexis.” This article will conclude with a consideration of the recalibration of 
transcendence by the “ecocritical turn,” which in recent years has produced its 																																																								
20 Peter Marcuse, “Herbert Marcuse's 'Identity',” in: Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, eds. 
John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 249. Zvi Tauber discusses 
Marcuse’s Jewish identity in more detail in “Herbert Marcuse on Jewish Identity, the 
Holocaust and Israel,” Telos, Issue 165 (Winter 2013), pp. 115-135. 
21 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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own discourse of ecoeschatology,22 uncovering the “earthliness” of immanent 
and historical hope within the Hebrew Scriptures. In reading Marcuse’s 
delinearization of time through a reformulated understanding of Judeo-
Christian eschatology, I conclude, we are afforded a fuller account of the way 
in which time underpins Marcuse’s appeals to utopia. 
 
 
Timelessness: Eros and the death drive  
 
Having arrived in the United States in 1934, Marcuse began addressing the 
apparent political impotence of the working class and the impossibility of 
revolution within mature capitalist societies. Revolutions had failed, as Paul 
Tillich argued, because “they expected to heal society without at the same time 
healing individuals who are the bearers of society.”23 Masking class 
antagonisms through the socially mandated consumption of luxury 
commodities thus revealed the apex of reified social relations under advanced 
industrial capitalism, through the production and regulation of desire. As 
Marcuse writes in his 1956 text Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry 
into Freud, “[t]he definition of the standard of living in terms of automobiles, 
television sets, airplanes and tractors,” all too easily “serves to justify the 
perpetuation of repression.”24 In this libertarian reconstitution of Freudian 
theory, Marcuse privileges memory as a crucial cognitive process in the 
necessary reorientation of Marxism (codified as “critical theory”),25 a tool with 
which the individual subject could relate him/herself to the failed or 
unrecorded revolutionary attempts through history and realize the repressive 
basis of civilized “progress.” Moreover, since the politicization of psychology 
had catapulted individual existence into the melee of public discourse, 
“private disorder,” as Marcuse writes, “reflects more directly than before the 
disorder of the whole” (EC xi).  
Freud’s metapsychology in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) 
unequivocally grounds the repressive basis of civilized progress in a 
diachronic modification of man’s instinctual nature. Thus the libidinal and 
primitive “pleasure ego” is confronted with the harsh actuality of the reality 
principle, whose primary function is to guard against actual or perceived 
“sensations of unpleasure” generated by the pleasure ego’s incompatibility 
with the strictures of civilized life.26 Marcuse argues that Freud’s analysis of 																																																								
22 For a good introduction to the emerging field of ecoeschatology, see Celia Deane-
Drummond, “Eco-eschatology” in Eco-Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 
2008), pp. 164-178. 
23 Paul Tillich, Political Expectation, ed. James L. Adams, trans. William R. Grout, Walter 
Bense, and James L. Adams (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 168. 
24 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (London: Ark 
Paperbacks, 1987), p. 153. All subsequent citations of this text will be referenced 
parenthetically as (EC). 
25 As Vincent Geoghegan notes, Marcuse referred to his philosophical approach as critical 
theory rather than Marxism. Similarly, the planned Institut für Marxismus was renamed the 
Institut für Sozialforschung, after it had moved to the USA in 1934, partly as a result of the 
fear of academic alienation at Columbia University where the Institute was offered temporary 
accommodation (Geoghegan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse 
[London: Pluto Press, 1981], pp. 20-1.) 
26 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, ed. James Strachey, trans. Joan Riviere 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1975), pp. 4-5. 
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repression conflates biological and socio-historical instinctual 
transformations, which allows Marcuse to emphasize the contingency of a 
unique mode of repression brought about by advanced industrial capitalism’s 
specific reality principle; what he terms the “performance principle” (EC 35). 
Wage labor, under the performance principle, thus alienates the worker from 
the completed products of his own labor, divorcing the unmediated activity of 
his labor outside of the sphere of exchange value, rupturing his essential 
“species-being,” and dividing him from other workers through the regulation 
of time.27 This regulation of time demands libidinal sacrifices, underscoring 
the inherently unstable antagonism at the heart of advanced industrial 
capitalism, as Marcuse writes: 
 
Man exists only part-time, during the working days, as an 
instrument of alienated performance; the rest of the time he is 
free for himself. (If the average working day, including 
preparation and travel to and from work, amounts to ten hours, 
and if the biological needs for sleep and nourishment require 
another ten hours, the free time would be four our of each 
twenty-four hours throughout the greater part of the individual’s 
life.) This free time would be potentially available for pleasure 
(EC 47; italics in original). 
 
Here Marcuse explicitly alludes to the universalization of clock time, whose 
precise calibrations of social life into punctual units of commodified labor also 
engendered a disciplinary regimentation of “free time.” “Labor time,” as he 
writes, “which is the largest part of the individual’s life-time, is painful time, 
for alienated labor is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure 
principle” (EC 45). Similarly, E. P. Thompson analyzes the shift in “time-
sense” inaugurated through the radical restructuring of working practices and 
social habits brought about by the disciplining of clock time in England during 
the Industrial Revolution; writing that “in mature capitalist society all time 
must be consumed, marketed, put to use; it is offensive for the labour force 
merely to ‘pass the time’.”28 For Marcuse, establishing an alternative mode of 
“pass[ing] the time” is central to the reversal of capitalism’s tightly governed 
desublimation of those forms of desire that maintain social cohesion and the 
productive regulation of sexuality (as he later explores in more detail in One-
Dimensional Man). In metapsychological terms, advanced industrial 
capitalism’s attacks on individual libido also result in the emasculation of 
Eros’s power for utilizing the death instinct in its building of culture. Thus 
“the perpetual restrictions on Eros ultimately weaken the life instincts and 
thus strengthen and release the very forces against which they were ‘called up’ 
– those of destruction” (EC 44).  
 The negation of pleasure is thus grounded in a consideration of 
alienated labor: outlining clock time’s exploitation as the bearer of advanced 
industrial capitalism’s performance principle, with its homogenized 																																																								
27 Marcuse’s argument here derives from Karl Marx’s theory of the alienation of labor in the 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan (Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1988), pp. 74-78. 
28 E. P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,” Past and Present 58 
(1) (1967): 56-97 (pp. 90-1; italics in original). 
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compression of all social life into the units of time optimal to the production 
and consumption of commodities. For Marcuse, this repressive temporality is, 
however, dialectically wedded to the timeless eternity of pleasure as mediated 
through the repressed id, which demands its own instinctual satisfaction and 
contains the germs of recalcitrant subjectivity. Against industrial capitalist 
society’s compartmentalization of time into units of productivity – with free 
time denoting the “rest” necessary to the laborer’s optimal performance on 
return to work – Marcuse thus posits an alternative mode of temporality 
grounded in “the eternity of pleasure”: 
 
Timelessness is the ideal of pleasure. Time has no power over 
the id, the original domain of the pleasure principle. But the ego, 
through which alone pleasure becomes real, is in its entirety 
subject to time (EC 231).  
 
Marcuse’s analysis of the “temporal reduction” of the libido (EC 48) is thus 
predicated upon the “timelessness” of pleasure; a temporal conflict suggested 
in Freud’s opposition of the two generative forces of civilization: the life-
enabling, libidinal forces of Eros and the “death drive,” or Todestrieb.29 As 
several critics have observed, temporality underpins many of Freud’s 
psychoanalytical discoveries. The conception of “belatedness” 
(Nachträglichkeit; also translated as “deferred action”), for example, draws 
attention to Freud’s concern with temporality through its emphasis on the 
“re-arrangement” or “re-transcription” of memory traces, as Jean Laplanche 
argues.30 Similarly, the narrativization of psychic transformations undertaken 
in the “talking cure” reveals its mediation between phenomenological and 
cosmological times, whilst Freud’s introduction in the Interpretation of 
Dreams of “screen memories,” or the residual traces (“day-residues”) of 
dreams, offers evidence of our unconscious childhood past.31 Finally, Freud’s 
discovery of the unconscious in a 1915 metapsychological paper announced its 
“timelessness” or atemporality; and the 1920 introduction of the death drive 
was similarly framed in atemporal terms, as its titanic clash with the pleasure 
principle of Eros, argues Freud, is enacted against the psychic backdrop of 
desire’s indifference to temporal regulation. Exhibiting a metaphysical tone 
previously unexplored in his clinical and technical papers,32 Freud writes in 
his late metapsychological works that:  																																																								
29 As C. Fred Alford reminds us, although Freud did not employ the term Thanatos in his 
writings, it has “become common to employ thanatos as a synonym for the Todestrieb, 
especially when contrasting the Todestrieb to eros.” C. Fred Alford, “Freud and Violence” in 
Anthony Elliott (ed.), Freud 2000 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 61-87 (p. 63). 
Marcuse, for instance, refers to this dualism as the opposition between Eros and Thanatos 
throughout Eros and Civilisation.  
30 John Fletcher, “The Letter in the Unconscious: The Enigmatic signifier in the Work of Jean 
Laplanche” in John Fletcher and Martin Stanton (eds), Jean Laplanche: Seduction, 
Translation, Drives (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1992), p. 112. 
31 David Wood observes the mediation between phenomenological and cosmological times in 
Time After Time (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), p. 32; for Freud’s references 
to “screen memories” and “day-residues,” see The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James 
Strachey (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1952), pp. 173n, 228. 
32 Although we should note that Freud’s discovery of the “timeless” character of the 
unconscious in his 1915 metapsychological paper is prefigured throughout his oeuvre. Adrian 
Johnston, “The Temporal Repressed in Freudian Psychoanalysis” in Time Driven: 
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There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of time; 
there is no recognition of the passage of time, and – a thing that 
is most remarkable and awaits consideration in philosophical 
thought – no alteration in its mental processes is produced by 
the passage of time. Wishful impulses which have never passed 
beyond the id, but impressions, too, which have been sunk into 
the id by repression, are virtually immortal.33  
 
As Adrian Johnston argues, the substitution in his 1933 New Introductory 
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis of the timelessness of the “id” for his earlier 
positing of the timelessness of the “unconscious” reveals a crucial slippage in 
Freud’s hypostatization of the unconscious. As Jean Laplanche suggests, the 
later treatment of atemporality indicates that it is the id which is ignorant of 
time, whilst the unconscious is in fact temporalized.34 Freud’s positing of the 
timelessness of the unconscious has therefore been read by critics as lapsing 
into quasi-metaphysical claims of the shrouded depths of psychic pre-
consciousness; offering a recondite mode of mental processing that Lacan 
warned was “pre-ontological.”35  
 
 
Temps retrouvé: redemption of the hopes of the past  
 
It is my argument that this slippage in Freud’s temporalization of the 
unconscious has some interesting consequences for Marcuse’s own 
application of what is generally referred to by critics as the Eros-Todestrieb 
dualism. Johnston’s reading of Freud’s metapsychological theory of memory 
through phenomenological categories of lived time reveals psychoanalysis’s 
“irreconcilable tension between time and eternity, between temporality and 
timelessness.”36 Marcuse’s utilization of the Freudian dualism between 
temporality and timelessness also raises pertinent questions concerning the 
Judeo-Christian eschatological underpinning of received notions of clock time 
and utopian futurity. Rational clock time, as Hannah Spahn argues, can be 
read as “a continuation and modification of the linear time of the Judeo-
Christian tradition.”37 However, if considered in relation to a more radical 
tradition of Jewish thinking that grounds utopian possibility within a 
redemptive mode of recollection or remembrance – what we might, in the 
spirit of Ricoeur’s lectures on Freud, call an archaeo-eschatology – Marcuse’s 
delineation of the libidinal transformation of subjectivity in his mature 
utopian philosophy offers us perhaps the clearest glimpse of those 																																																																																																																																																														
Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 2005), pp. 5-22 (p. 7). 
33 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis in The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. 24 Vols. (Vol. 22), ed. and trans. 
James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson 
(London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953-1974), p. 74. 
34 Johnston, pp. 15-16. 
35 Jean Laplanche qtd Ibid., p. 13. 
36 Ibid., p. 19. 
37 Hannah Spahn, “Rational Time” in Thomas Jefferson, Time and History (Charlottesville, 
CA: University of Virginia Press, 2011), p. 35.  
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unacknowledged ties to his Jewish heritage I mentioned earlier. Freud’s late 
theory of instincts allows Marcuse to reposition the question of revolutionary 
agency through the framework of remembrance’s “negative” or critical powers, 
in which the crime of patricide recurs throughout history in the form of a 
“return of the repressed,” continually re-enacting the generational rebellion 
against established authority. The task, then, becomes an archaeological 
undertaking in which the ontogenetic repression of the individual is 
approached through sublimated instinctual memories at the phylogenetic 
level. This process of unearthing civilization’s earliest rebellion would thus 
uncover those radicalized Proustian temps retrouvé whose alternatives to the 
repressive present offer anticipatory glimpses for ruptural modes of futurity. 
As Marcuse writes: “Recalling the dominion of the primal pleasure principle, 
where freedom from want was a necessity, the id carries the memory traces of 
this state forward into every present future: it projects the past into the future” 
(EC 33).  
Marcuse’s arguably uncritical employment of the Freudian notion of 
the timeless unconscious also raises issues concerning the influence of Jewish 
and Christian eschatologies on linear models of historical progress. As 
Jacques Derrida argues, “the unconscious is no doubt timeless only from the 
standpoint of a certain vulgar conception of time”;38 and it could similarly be 
contended that conflated accounts of a singularized or “deconstructed” Judeo-
Christian eschatology are predicated upon vulgar notions of teleological 
projection. Certainly, the understanding of eternity as a timeless, otherworldly 
realm of fulfilled expectation that posits a self-contained exteriority 
inaccessible to our here-and-now is a misreading of Jewish messianism. As 
David Novak reminds us, the Jewish doctrine of the Messiah works “to project 
the future out of the past.” Thus, “due to its political character [messianism] 
will always be more immediately relevant to this-worldly concerns.”39 
Messianic philosophy is, however, frequently criticized for inducing 
anticipations of the future that breed passivity and hopes for salvific 
transcendence. It remains crucial, therefore, to distinguish what Ernst Bloch 
called “human-eschatological, explosively posited messianism” from “static, 
apologetic myth;” not least because the metaphysical specter of what Derrida 
refers to as the “messianic extremity” raises significant problems in terms of 
positing a time that is somehow paradoxically exterior to time.40  
We might, therefore, apprehend messianism through a temporal 
framework that avoids the transcendent exteriority of an eternal horizon and 
focuses its gaze instead upon alternative understandings of messianic rupture. 
As Michael Löwy quotes in his study of Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History”: 
 
it is not a matter of awaiting the Messiah, as in the dominant 
tradition of rabbinical Judaism, but of bringing about his 
coming. […] Benjamin belongs to the dissident tradition of those 																																																								
38 Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 196-231 (p. 215). 
39 Novak, p. 126. 
40 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 3, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul 
Knight (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 1193; Jacques Derrida, 
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, 
trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 45. 
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who were known as the dohakei haketz, those who ‘hasten the 
end of time’ [my italics].41  
 
Despite his avowed secularism, it is my argument that Marcuse’s libertarian 
Freudo-Marxism in Eros and Civilisation can be identified as belonging to the 
dohakei haketz tradition of Judaic messianism. Indeed, several critics have 
noted this congruence of Hegelian Marxist dialectics with messianic 
utopianism at work in Marcuse’s oeuvre. Jürgen Habermas describes 
Marcuse’s “chiliastic trust” in the project of rupturing linear historical time 
through a rescuing of pre-historical instinctual structures. Similarly, Adrian 
Johnston argues that Marcuse’s historicisation of Freud offers a “messianic 
prediction of a possible ‘libidinal liberation’.”42 Meanwhile, R. N. Berki argues 
that Marcuse’s critique of the sinful life of capitalist modernity is couched in 
“the tone of a Saint Paul and Savonarola,” owing more to the idiom of 
religious radicalism than to post-Enlightenment political radicalism: 
 
it is not unreasonable to look upon Marcuse’s adaptation of 
Freud as an attempt to turn “metapsychology” into a kind of 
modern humanistic theology, complete with an account of 
genesis, a categorical designation of goods and evils, a story of 
the fall, as well as a blueprint for future salvation.43  
 
If Marcuse’s reformulation of the Freudian timeless unconscious constructs a 
“modern humanistic theology,” we should remind ourselves that Freud’s own 
model of primal repression (Urverdrängung) reframes the Jewish obligation 
to remember within the psychoanalytic framework of the primal prehistory of 
mankind. As Paul Ricoeur writes, Freud’s thesis in Moses and Monotheism is 
contingent upon re-reading the “truth” of religion as enacting the repetition of 
civilization’s memory of patricide in which Yahweh comes to represent “the 
sublime resurgence of the father of the horde.”44  
 In the context of Jewish utopian messianism, then, the “Great Refusal” 
of Orpheus-as-liberator (EC 236) can thus be read as enacting a hastening of 
the end of time through the political tradition of messianic rupture; seizing the 
historical opportunity to resist capitalism’s reified “Happy Consciousness” and 
refusing an apathetic acceptance of death as ontological essence. For Marcuse, 
Orpheus instructs us to realize that death cannot be reduced to any pure 
negation of being since the end of time is signified by utopia, not death.45 
Unlike Prometheus, who toils beneath the mighty albatross of progress, the 
legendary heroes Orpheus and Narcissus thus possess a vitally antagonistic 
relationship with the reality of the performance principle that militates 
against what Marcuse calls “the temporal dismemberment of pleasure” (EC 																																																								
41 Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’, trans. 
Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2005), p. 104. Löwy cites Yosef Haïm Yerushalmi’s theory of 
“messianic activism” in Zahor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1996), p. 24. 
42 Habermas, pp. 9-10; Johnston, p. 244. 
43 (Berki 65, 74). 
44 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 244. 
45 Emmanuel Levinas makes a similar point in God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 98-99. 
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47). This mutilation of the time of pleasure must therefore be met with a 
commitment to the total negation of established society and subsequent 
instantiation of qualitative change. As Marcuse recalls in his lecture delivered 
at The Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation held at the Camden 
Roundhouse in July 1967: 
 
Walter Benjamin quotes reports that during the Paris Commune, 
in all corners of the city of Paris there were people shooting at 
the clocks on the towers of the churches, palaces and so on, 
thereby consciously or half-consciously expressing the need that 
somehow time has to be arrested; that at least the prevailing, the 
established time continuum has to be arrested, and that a new 
time has to begin – a very strong emphasis on the qualitative 
difference and on the totality of the rupture between the new 
society and the old. 46 
 
This arrest of the “established time continuum” can be read as being 
predicated upon the Orphic and Narcissistic myths whose rebellion signifies 
“the desperate effort to arrest the flow of time” (EC 191). Marcuse’s Hellenistic 
sources are interesting in this regard. The “aesthetic dimension” signified a 
powerfully utopian aspect of experience for Marcuse, and his privileging of 
literature as a crucial indicator of the aesthetic dimension can be traced 
throughout his intellectual career: from his doctoral dissertation on the 
German Künstlerroman, or “novel of the artist” (completed at the University 
of Freiburg in 1922), throughout his philosophical writings until his final 
work, The Aesthetic Dimension, published two years before Marcuse’s death 
in 1979. Ernst Bloch, who similarly examined the Künstlerroman in his essay 
“A Philosophical View of the Novel of the Artist” (1965), similarly drew on 
Hellenistic literary figures, privileging Odysseus and Prometheus as 
“Venturers Beyond the Limits,” or exemplars of the artistic defiance of death 
(in company with Mozart’s Don Giovanni, Goethe’s Faust, Cervantes’ Don 
Quixote and Shakespeare’s Prospero) who articulate that “something is 
missing, the fair moment is yet to come.”47 If we consider Marcuse’s literary 
interests alongside those of Ernst Bloch, we can therefore identify an 
interesting engagement between avant-garde modernism (indeed, the term 
“Great Refusal” is borrowed from the surrealists),48 Schillerian Idealist 
aesthetics and a Goethean critique of Romanticism which is prefaced with 
recourse to the Greek “age of epic poetry” where, as Marcuse writes, “life was 																																																								
46 Herbert Marcuse, “Liberation from the Affluent Society” in The Dialectics of Liberation, ed. 
David Cooper (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), pp.  175-192 (p. 177). Subsequently referred 
to as (LAS). 
47 Bloch’s argument in this essay is expanded in The Principle of Hope, Vol. 3, p. 1014. A 
comparative reading of Bloch and Marcuse, which would benefit from a fuller consideration in 
critical scholarship, is also apt given Marcuse’s comments at a conference he attended in the 
1960s with Ernst Bloch: “I am happy and honoured to talk to you in the presence of Ernst 
Bloch today, whose work Geist der Utopie, published more than forty years ago, has 
influenced at least my generation, and has shown how realistic utopian concepts can be, how 
close to action, how close to practice.” These comments are recollected in his 1969 essay of 
“The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration,” Praxis 5 (1-2) 
(1969): 20-25 (p. 20). 
48 Wolin, Op. cit., p. 14. 
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itself art and mythology life, the public property of the people.”49 His 
invocation of a non-repressive Schillerian “aesthetic ethos” that develops its 
own “radical sensibility” via the mythological figures of Orpheus and 
Narcissus thus reveals, as similarly Hellenistic ur-texts certainly do for Bloch, 
Marcuse’s intellectual inheritance of a tradition that Russell Jacoby has called 
“iconoclastic utopianism.” As Jacoby writes: “[i]n the same way that God 
could not be depicted for the Jews, the future could not be described for the 
iconoclastic utopians; it could only be approached through hints and 
parables.”50 Marcuse’s invocation of non-repressive Narcissistic sexuality and 
Orphic creativity can thus be read as an allegorical illustration of a utopian 
futurity whose temporal reconciliation with the timelessness of eternity is 
consistent with the messianic tradition of iconoclastic utopianism.  
According to this messianic tradition we might then wonder whether 
Marcuse’s utilisation of Hellenistic designations belies a rejection of standard 
linear time that obscures its Jewish origins. However, as Zvi Tauber writes in 
this issue, after his death Marcuse’s wife Erica Sherover-Marcuse and his son 
Peter Marcuse wrote that “[t]he aspect of the Jewish tradition with which 
Herbert most strongly identified is the importance it places on the struggle for 
justice in this life, in this world: its insistence on the ongoing effort “to use life 
to help bring about a better life”.51 This familial insistence that Marcuse’s 
strongest association with Judaism lay in his insistence upon “justice in this 
life, in this world” suggests Marcuse’s adherence to a secular understanding of 
Jewish messianism; what, as I referred to above, Michael Löwy has called the 
“dissident tradition” of dohakei haketz whose hastening of the end of time 
fundamentally opposes rabbinical Judaism’s positing of Messiah-as-
transcendence. Indeed, this reading of the secular Jewish intellectual currents 
that animate Marcuse’s delinearized utopian temporality of arrest is indicated 
by Marcuse’s comments in interview. Whilst he did not overtly position such 
ruptural temporalities and their utopian potential within any Jewish 
messianic genealogy in his philosophical works, when asked about his Jewish 
influences in interview Marcuse said that he was not inspired by the Talmud 
and Torah but by the “prophetic recasting of the revolutionary imagination,” 
in which he read Exodus as a revolutionary movement, whose memory is 
ritually enacted in Jewish families during Passover ceremonies each year.52 
Ernst Bloch similarly examines Exodus as a revolutionary movement in 
Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of Exodus and the Kingdom (1968).53 
Offering an anthropocentric reading of the Bible’s revolutionary and utopian 
impulses, Bloch asserts that the conservative ethos of Judaeo-Christian 																																																								
49 Marcuse qtd in Douglas Kellner, “Origins: Politics, Art and Philosophy in the Young 
Marcuse” in Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 13-
37 (p. 20). 
50 Russell Jacoby, Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), p. xv. 
51 Zvi Tauber, “Herbert Marcuse on Jewish Identity, the Holocaust and Israel,” Telos, Issue 
165 (Winter 2013), pp. 115-135. Tauber cites Erica Sherover-Marcuse and Peter Marcuse, "To 
the Editors", New York Review of Books, September 27,1979; “An Open Letter to Friends of 
Herbert Marcuse,” New German Critique (No. 18, Fall 1979), p. 28.  
52 Herbert Marcuse qtd Eliot Ratzman, “Marcuse and Monotheism: Sources for Jewish 
Liberation A/theology,” Presentation at Critical Refusals Conference, University of 
Pennsylvania, October 2011. 
53 Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of Exodus and the Kingdom, trans. J. T. 
Swann (London: Verso, 2009). Subsequently referred to as (AC). 
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theology is rooted in Greek thought, which he describes as “being-oriented 
and anti-historical” (AC 44). The retrogressive focus of the Platonic 
philosophy of anamnesis in traditional biblical scholarship thus prevents what 
Bloch sees as the utopian “Novum” underpinning the revolutionary, historical 
struggles in the Bible: the “buoyant expectation” of the Exodus from Egypt 
mapped out in Job, with its messianic, “anti-Yahweh” message, and the 
Eschaton expressed in the Book of Revelations, whose strong feelings of 
dissatisfaction directly challenge religious institutionalism (AC 44-5, 14-15, 
24).  
Marcuse can similarly be identified as differentiating between 
conservative and progressive strands of Jewish messianic thinking in his 
analysis of the utopian imagination. His intellectual recourse to Eros’ act of 
patricidal remembrance can be read as echoing what Gershom Scholem calls 
the “restorative tendency” of rabbinic Judaism. Nourished by a utopian 
impulse which projects upon the past its Messianic hope, the restorative 
aspect is also dialectically in tension with the vision of a completely different, 
new time whose ruptural qualities negate Judaism’s conservative impulse 
towards Halakhah, or the preservation of religious law.54 The three tendencies 
of conservative, restorative and utopian Judaism, argues Scholem, thus offer 
a messianic temporal structure at odds with itself; straining towards the 
restoration of an idealized projection of the past, whilst simultaneously 
shaping the referent of a transformative utopian vision that would negate such 
conservation. With its internal tensions, this messianic structure does, 
however, signal a mode of imagined temporal rebellion whose fundamental 
alterity (or, in Marcuse’s words “negativity”) offers a total rejection of 
“technological rationality” (EC 85). Radical memory invokes the “timeless past 
and forbidden future” that the civilized ego under the reified social relations of 
capitalism must continually reassert (EC 245-6). “The authentic utopia,” as 
Marcuse writes in The Aesthetic Dimension (1978), is “grounded in 
recollection.”55 This interrelationship, however, does not suggest that the 
revolutionary task should be to conserve or elevate the past but rather, as 
Adorno and Horkheimer famously observe in Dialectic of Enlightenment, to 
actuate “the redemption of the hopes of the past.”56 As Marcuse is careful to 
qualify, the symbolic defeat of time enacted by such figures as Eros and 
Orpheus, can only remain “artistic and spurious” unless it is wedded to 
concrete events, since “remembrance is no real weapon unless it is translated 
into historical action” (EC 233).  
 
 
Ecological time: from Eros to Eschaton  
 
Although it might at first glance appear hopelessly abstruse, the dismantling 
of the performance principle through invoking an Orphic time of cathected 
potentiality needs, however, to begin somewhere. As Marcuse contends, “we 																																																								
54 Gershom Scholem, “Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism” in The 
Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality, trans. Michael A. Meyer 
and Hillel Halkin (New York Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 1-36 (pp. 3-4).  
55 Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, 
trans. Herbert Marcuse and Erica Sherover (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 73. 
56 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cumming (London: Verso, 1997), p. xv.  
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must begin formulating these features, no matter how metaphysical, no 
matter how Utopian” (LAS 177-178). In “Progress and Freud’s Theory of 
Instincts” (1956)57 Marcuse discusses the internal, psychic dynamics through 
which individuals negate their own possible liberation – what he memorably 
terms the “psychic Thermidor” (FL 38). Here he argues that it remains 
possible to replace a repressive reality (performance) principle with a 
qualitatively different mode of production and consumption. In terms of the 
Freudian instinctual framework, the de-industrialization of Fordist labor 
would therefore release the individual from an alienated sphere of robotized 
existence and would consequently abolish the temporal distinction between 
alienated labor and free time. Work would be liberated to become play, as “the 
force of the instinctual energy released by mechanized labor would no longer 
have to be expended on unpleasurable activity and could be changed back into 
erotic energy” (FL 39-40).  
This idea is given further consideration in Marcuse’s later text An 
Essay on Liberation (1969), in which he discusses the temporal division 
between the two realms of freedom and labor, or leisure (EL 20-1). Socialism, 
he argues, must overcome the presupposition that human freedom could only 
ever occur beyond the factory gates, and should perforce interrogate the 
Fourierist possibility that socially necessary labor could become play (EL 21-
2). The eroticization of a liberated time of labor-as-play is central to 
Marcuse’s glimpses of the “concrete,” rather than “abstract,” utopian 
possibility (to use Ernst Bloch’s distinction)58 that lies dormant within the 
workplace. Under the reality principle of advanced industrial capitalism, Eros 
has become localized into monogamous, reproductive sexuality, reducing the 
organism’s pleasure principle into a serviceable instrument of labor by 
draining its erotic energy and harnessing its gratification into social 
productivity (FL 34-5). However, in order to broach the question of what a 
qualitatively different futurity would look like we need to refer to a later text in 
Marcuse’s oeuvre: his essay on “Nature and Revolution” in Counter-
Revolution and Revolt (1972).59 It is in this text that we find the beginnings of 
a more fully fleshed out consideration of what an eroticized, Fourierist mode 
of non-repressive work might encompass, and in the remainder of this article 
I shall read this text through recent scholarship on “the greening of 
eschatology.”  
In “Nature and Revolution” Marcuse argues that nature is gradually 
being rediscovered “as an ally in the struggle against exploitative societies in 
which the violation of nature aggravates the violation of man” (NR 59). 
Nature, therefore, must be understood as a historical category rather than an 
unchanging ontological essence since man encounters the landscape in an 
always-already mediated sense. In advanced industrial capitalism nature 																																																								
57 Translated into English and published in the collection Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, 
Politics, and Utopia, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1970), pp. 28-43. Subsequently referred to as (FL). “Progress and Freud’s Theory of Instincts” 
derives from two lectures originally delivered in 1956 to commemorate Sigmund Freud’s 100th 
birthday.  
58 Bloch distinguishes concrete utopian anticipation from “merely abstract utopianizing” in 
The Principle of Hope, Vol. 1, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986), p. 157. 
59 Herbert Marcuse, “Nature and Revolution” in Counter-Revolution and Revolt (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 59-78. Subsequently referred to as (NR). 
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thus confronts man through the highly technologized and commercialized 
topography of industrial-scale agribusiness; with its tightly-controlled 
patchwork of private property, militarized-industrial sites, and the 
outsourcing of refuse and pollutants into specialized zones of waste 
management. Thus, “the violation of nature is inseparable,” writes Marcuse, 
“from the economy of capitalism” (NR 61). Man’s solidarity with nature rests 
on the double meaning of “nature” as Marx employs the term in the Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: both external nature, as well as man’s 
own “species being” or “essence” (Gattungswesen).60 In discussing the 
emancipation of the senses posed in Marx’s text, Marcuse argues that Marx’s 
“outrageously unscientific, metaphysical notion” (NR 65) of species-being still 
contains a residual trace of “the hubris of domination” (NR 69) in its 
conception of the natural world as crafted through congealed human labor 
and its positing of the potential of a “humanized” nature to respond to man’s 
liberated gratification. The Marxist conception of nature, Marcuse argues, 
thus fails to conceive of nature as “a subject in its own right”: “as a cosmos 
with its own potentialities, necessities, and chances” (NR 60, 69; italics in 
original). However, this conception retains some usefulness in its recapturing 
of the ancient understanding of the primacy of recollection in the acquisition 
of knowledge: 
 
Recollection thus is not remembrance of a Golden Past (which 
never existed), of childhood innocence, primitive man, et cetera. 
Recollection as epistemological faculty rather is synthesis, 
reassembling the bits and fragments which can be found in the 
distorted humanity and distorted nature (NR 70). 
 
Marcuse’s reading of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts thus reveals 
his fundamental critique of linear teleology. Freedom, as a “regulative concept 
of reason,” moves man “not toward Heaven or Paradise” but “an ever more 
peaceful, joyful struggle with the inexorable resistance of society and nature” 
(NR 70-1). In order to understand this non-alienated sensibility, which is 
capable of experiencing “the erotic energy of nature” (NR 74), we need to 
consider our opening question of the replacement of pre-industrial cyclical 
temporalities by a linear understanding of historical time modeled upon a 
“deconstructed” Judeo-Christian eschatology. For Marcuse, such teleology has 
become synonymous with capitalism’s driving logic of productivity, and the 
instantiation of a non-repressive transformation of society would liberate our 
instinctual structure. As he writes in “Progress and Freud’s Theory of 
Instincts,” under such transformation: 
 
[a]lienated labor would be transformed into the free play of 
human faculties and forces. In consequence all contentless 
transcendence would come to a close, and freedom would no 
longer be an eternally failing project. Productivity would define 																																																								
60 Marx writes that “[i]n tearing away from man the object of his production … estranged 
labor tears from him his species life, his real species objectivity, and transforms his advantage 
over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him (Marx 
77). 
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itself in relation to receptivity, existence would be experienced 
not as continually expanding and unfulfilled becoming but as 
existence or being with what is and can be. Time would not seem 
linear, as a perpetual line or rising curve, but cyclical, as the 
return contained in Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘perpetuity of 
pleasure’ (FL 40-1; my italics). 
 
It is my argument that Marcuse’s most concrete glimpses of a utopian 
transformation of society – as illustrated through his references to a 
Schillerian culture of sensuous receptivity to art, an Orphic understanding of 
deregulated pleasure and defiance of the finitude of death, and the Fourierist 
transformation of work into play – are predicated upon a delinearization of 
historical time. This finds its clearest expression in a cyclical model of time in 
which, as Adorno writes, “[t]he image of what is oldest in nature” thus 
“reverses dialectically into the cipher of the not-yet-existing, the possible.”61 
Undulating between the pre-history of nature and the not yet of natural 
futurity, this alternative temporal modality cannot be understood outside of 
the eschatological framework to which, I contend, it is directly responding. It 
remains crucial to distinguish, then, between various conflated 
understandings of the “last days,” or Eschaton. Whilst the glinting dream of 
capitalist technological modernity is frequently cited as a secularized Judeo-
Christian temporal narrative, we should recall that there are multiple readings 
of eschatology. In her 1994 essay “Eschatology, Ecology and a Green 
Ecumenacy,” Catherine Keller argues that modernity’s faith in progress and 
capitalism’s triumphalist conservative realism are “bastardized” eschatologies. 
In their imagined conquest of nature these teleological projects uncover 
weaknesses already inherent within the biblical texts: including the 
“patriarchal privilege” of history over nature, the dissociation of hopes for the 
future from immanentist understandings of present struggle, appeals to 
coercive power, and the hierarchical nature of religious authority.62 Keller’s 
argument is that Jewish and Christian theologies fundamentally need to 
renegotiate the meaning of Eschaton. Whilst traditional eschatology’s 
indifference towards nature leads to an unqualified quietism that is complicit 
with the earth’s destruction – reducing faith to “the hope for an afterlife 
rather than for life itself”63 – this is the result, argues Keller, of the 
transcendental reorientation of spirit by Hellenized theologies. Earlier 
Christian theology and Hebrew scripture, by contrast, are rich in ecological 
resonance and insisted on the resurrection’s “bodiliness.”  
In her repositioning of the “earthliness” of the resurrection, Keller’s 
“ecoeschatology”64 offers a useful recalibration of the non-transcendent 
function of hope in the Hebrew Scriptures. This historicization of eschatology 
is vital if we are to confront current ecoscarcities and recover what Marcuse 
called “the erotic cathexis” of man’s natural environment (NR 60). There can 																																																								
61 Theodor W. Adorno, “Nature as ‘Not Yet’” in The Green Studies Reader: From 
Romanticism to Ecocriticism, ed. Laurence Coupe (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 81-83 (p. 
83). 
62 Catherine Keller, “Eschatology, Ecology and a Green Ecumenacy” in Rebecca S. Chopp and 
Mark Lewis Taylor (eds), Reconstructing Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Augsberg 
Fortress, 1994), pp. 326-345 (pp. 335, 340). 
63 Ibid., pp. 329, 331; italics in original. 
64 Ibid., p. 343. 
Caroline Edwards _____________________________________________________________________________________________	
	 19 
be no liberation of man’s lived temporal experience from the repressive 
strictures of the performance principle without the liberation of the natural 
environment from the yoke of objectification; with its tacit condoning of the 
rapacious extraction of surplus value from a dwindling sphere of biodiversity. 
Cyclical time thus offers Marcuse an Orphic recourse with which to confront 
the linear time of advanced industrial capitalism; a time of receptivity between 
man and nature that refutes “all contentless transcendence” (FL 40) and 
releases the free play of human energies. Moreover, this delinearization 
responds to, and is shaped by, the utopian function of redeemed collective 
memory that is central to Judaism. As I have outlined above, Freud can be 
read as explicitly invoking the power of such radicalized temps retrouvé in his 
phylogenetic reading of the pre-historical rebellion of patricide as an 
instinctual forerunner of the rebellion against an authoritarian Yahweh; and 
we should read Marcuse’s own privileging of the Freudian Eros-Todestrieb 
dualism as latently redefining political struggle through the affirmation of a 
redemptive model of cyclical time. This time responds to the Jewish 
apocalyptic-utopian tradition of eschatological salvation within this world; a 
time, which as Ernst Bloch writes, lies “midway between memory and 
prophecy.”65 
An ecocritical reading of biblical scripture that repositions the 
relationship between nature and eschatology thus responds to Marcuse’s call 
for the “liberation from time which unites man with god, man with nature” 
(EC 162). Perhaps using a reformulated understanding of ecoeschatology we 
can pose significant questions concerning theology’s complicity with the 
aggressive hyper-industrialization of the planet’s ecological diversity. 
Confronting the growing chasm between the two increasingly polarized 
registers of “mere theology” and “radical atheism” is a vital task in the twenty-
first-century and productive solutions to capitalism’s egregious excesses – 
both, in Marx’s formulation, of man’s internal nature as well as of the 
beleaguered environment with its looming ecocatastrophe – must find 
themselves able to move between these two discursive registers in a common 
front against the continued exploitation and degradation of our finite natural 
resources. In this task, Marcuse remains a crucial figure since his philosophy 
offers us, as R. N. Berki writes, a productive tension in which “the political and 
the religious strains of radical thought” collide.66  
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